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CYBERNETICS AND SOME PROBLEMS O F  
PHILOSOPHY 
T HE stimulus of certain engineering problems such as the design of automatic gun controls and high-speed com- 
puting machines provoked a rapid consolidation of ideas de- 
rived from hitherto largely independent fields of inquiry, in- 
cluding pure mathematics, statistics, electrical engineering, 
and neurophysiology. The result was a science that, like other 
historical products, is both new and old-old in many of its 
component features but new in degree and manner of in- 
tegration. Mr. Norbert Wiener brought this new develop- 
ment to general notice in the book strikingly called Cyber- 
netics,' the name coined by him and his associates for the 
science of communication and control in animals and ma- 
chines. 
"Cybernetics" is derived from a Greek word for steersman, 
which is related to the Latin ancestor of our word "gover- 
nor."' I t  is an apt name for a study that centers in the prob- 
lem of automatic governors or controls. And if the movement 
had a symbol, it would probably be the old-fashioned fly-ball 
governor, which was pictured on the cover of the Scientific 
Ame?.ican when it devoted an issue to automatic contr01s.~ 
Familiar since the eighteenth century, that device attracted 
no particular scientific attention4 until discoveries along 
different lines brought into pron~inence the remarkable prin- 
ciples which it happens to exemplify with great simplicity. I t  
may also be said that the peculiar nature of self-adjusting 
systems had been recognized and appreciated qualitatively 
by more speculative minds more than a generation before the 
advent of c~bernetics,~ which had to await a reasonably ade- 
quate quantitative treatment of such systems. By the present 
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time, quantitative methods have been extended over the 
whole range of fundamental cybernetic subject matter, so 
that a new mastery of ideas and new suggestions for experi- 
ment promise Inany fruitful advances. As is the way with 
scientific ideas, these have philosophical interest. My purpose 
is to explain in the simplest possible way what is new in 
cybernetics in order that we may then consider what insights 
philosophers may obtain fmm this source. 
From the pointof view of general philosophy, the most 
important lesson of cybernetics is the explicit recognition that 
self-adjusting mechanisms cannot be understood solely in 
tern~s of the utilization of power or the transformations of 
energy, although of course these also are necessarily involved. 
If control is to be exerted over a given factor (e.g., speed, 
temperature, phase difference, hydrogen ion concentration), 
the state of the factor to be regulated must be communicated 
somehow to the controlling mechanism, which otheiwise 
would achieve adjustment only by chance. The governor, 
moreover, must react to the communication in such a way as 
to reduce to a minimum the deviation of the system from a 
certain state through the operation of negative feedback. 
Our simple flyball governor illustrates both these features in 
an obvious manner. When the engine, for example, to which it 
is attached speeds up, "information5' concerning this change 
is communicated to the governor in the form of an increased 
rate at which it spins, causing the flyballs to rise higher and 
close the throttle correspondingly, so that the engine wilI 
tend to slow down again. When the engine, on the other hand, 
slows down, the balls drop lower and increase the engine 
speed by opening the throttle a suitable amount. A properly 
designed governor will thus keep t l ~ e  speed of the engine 
constant within comparatively narrow limits under normal 
conditions. Some of the power output of the engine is "fed 
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back" into a throttle control that opposes any tendency to 
change speed. Such a feedback is "negative." But the flyball 
is the most important part of t l ~ e  device, because it mediates 
the control of the negative feedback by automatically "com- 
puting" a throttle setting adjusted to the speed of the engine 
as represented by the spin of the governor. Thus the flyball 
symbolizes a whole class of devices which belong among the 
most remarkable achievements of recent engineering: the 
great computing machines, both digital and analogue. 
By stretching analogy a bit further we observe that auto- 
matic governors resemble animals in possessing "'receptors" 
to obtain "information," a 'brain" to "compute" appropriate 
responses, and an cceffector" mechanism to carry them out. 
Conceived with sufficient lattitude, analogues to these items 
of animal equipment are by no means uncommon but may be 
recognized (or at  least surmised) in a great many natural and 
artificial systems from the thermostatically controlled gas 
oven to the human being. Controls involving negative feed- 
back appear to enter into the structure of any system s&- 
ciently organized to be capable of acting as a whole because 
of mutual adjustment of parts, whether the system be a ma- 
chine, a plant, an animal, or a society. 
The communication of engine speed to flyball governor is 
accomplished by such simple mechanical means that its signif- 
icance as communication easily escapes notice. But the 
practical importance of the problem of transmitting signals 
and the technical mastery of it during the last two or three 
generations needs no further comment than an allusion to 
telegraph, wireless, telephone, teletype, radio, television, ra- 
dar, not to mention phonographs, sonar, guided missiles, and 
high speed computing machines. In all cases, the accurate 
sending and receiving of signals are subject to stringent physi- 
cal limitations. And communication engineering, which is 
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primarily concerned with accurate transmission and repro- 
duction of signals, has found its problems related to the 
fundamental statistical characteristics of physical processes. 
Thus "information" has come to stand for a physical quan- 
tity, the measure of orderliness in a set of events. I t  does not 
imply cognition but is the negative of entropy: the measure 
of disorderliness or 'noise." 
While the above exposition of cybernetic ideas makes no 
pretention to completeness, it has perhaps succeeded in em- 
phasizing the main points. Of the greatest importance is the 
new idea of mechanism involved in those systems, of wide 
natural occurrence and inestimable tecl~nological promise, 
that automatically adjust themselves to variations in relevant 
aspects of their physical environment. That idea portends a 
change, perhaps far-reaching, in our approach to a variety of 
problems, and thus illustrates anew the power of ideas de- 
rived from science and engineering to expand the mind and 
alter established habits of thought. That is why cybernetics 
attracts the attention of philosophers; they must try to ar- 
rive at a balanced critical judgment of its larger implications. 
It is not my intention to offer here a system of cybernetic 
philosophy or even a philosophy of  cybernetic!^. There is 
more than enough to do just examining the bearing of the 
new ideas on a few well-worn subjects of controversy. In gen- 
eral we shall find that cybernetic ideas stand in a curious 
dialectical relation to traditional problems, I t  goes without 
saying that cybernetics is itself thoroughly mechanistic in 
spirit and intent, and its successes obviously win new ground 
for mechanism. On the other hand, it rehabili- 
tates, one after another, a series of claims that tough-minded 
empiricists and materialists have customarily rejected. I t  
makes mechanism subtler and more adequate to facts than 
formerly, but it weakens the reductionist prejudice against the 
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efficacy of nonelementary realities, Cybernetics thus rein- 
forces the tendency of recent naturalism to expand the con- 
ception of mechanism to fit facts of life and mind. I t  may help 
us in the end to grasp the way in which mechanisms serve the 
recognized purposes of higher intelligence. But that develop- 
ment still awaits the future. For the present we shall do well 
to look closeIy at claims voiced in the first enthusiasm of dis- 
covery. Let us, therefore, address ourselves to some specific 
issues on which cybernetic ideas bear. 
It is appropriate to begin with a topic which Norbert 
Wiener has discussed, namely, vitalism. Having first de- 
veloped the parallel between the automata of the present age 
and the living organism, both of which possess structures for 
receiving impressions, for performing actions, and for adjust- 
ing the latter to the former, Wiener goes on to show that the 
mechanisms of physiology and of these automata fall under 
the same physical theory, a theory indeed which belongs to 
statistical mechanics rather than to classical mechanics. Since 
output must succeed input, the past-future relation is funda- 
mental; time has an irreversible direction for all such mecha- 
nisms (they cannot run backwards). '"Thus," he concludes, 
"the modern automaton exists in the same sort of Bergsonian 
time as the living organism; and hence there is no reason in 
Bergson's considerations why the essential mode of function- 
ing of the living organism should not be the same as that of 
the automaton of this type. Vitalism has won to the extent 
that even mechanisms correspond to the time structure of 
vitalism; but . . . this victory is complete defeat, for from 
every point of view which has the slightest relation to moral- 
ity or religion, the new mechanics is fully as mechanistic as 
the old, . . . In fact, the whole mechanist-vitalist controversy 
has been relegated to the limbo of badly posed questions."' 
Offhand dismissal of what may seem to have been a rather 
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curious incident in recent intellectual history does not display 
the cybernetic contribution in the best light. I t  obscures what 
was legitimate in the question, however ineptly posed, and 
thus conceals the precise nature of the problem to which 
cybernetics may provide a superior answer, The vitalism con- 
troversy arose because men who studied the details of 
organic evolution and of individuaI development found the 
sweeping claims of nineteenth and early twentieth century 
mechanists unverified in detail. Bergson, whom Wiener par- 
ticularly singles out for criticism, does not differ from Wiener 
in what he denies but in what he affirms. He saw that the 
evolutionary method of understanding living things had an 
essentially historical character at variance with tile non- 
historical theorems of classical mechanics. He could detect 
no resemblance between the time of the living entity and the 
reversible "time" of classical physics. Time is more than a 
timeless variable for a being that is deteimined to action not 
by some immediate compulsion alone, but by the cumulative 
influence of its total past and by the insistent tendency of its 
vital processes. Thus he stressed memory and action against 
the "cinematographic" picture of change, which he attributed 
to the mechanist. In cinematographic time, novelty cannot 
arise. Each momentary state of things has its complete being 
in the moment and is completely accounted for by derivation 
from the immediately preceding state. It neither grows from 
roots in a significant past nor possesses freedom to generate a 
novel future. 
That was the conception of process against which vitalism, 
as Wiener agrees, proved victorious, But the victory by no 
means awaited the advent of cybernetics. Ernst Cassirer's 
study of the history of the controversy among theoretical 
biologists in close touch with empirical findings shows that 
vitalism and mechanism ceased to represent 'cwholly dog- 
Cybernetics and Philosophy 53 
matic antitheses." The notion of purposiveness, with which 
some vitalists began, gave way to that of wholeness or organi- 
zation as the distinctively biological category. The biologist 
had no furtl1e~ temptation to postulate an immaterial agency 
or "entelechy" to account for the peculiar phenomena of life. 
He did not have to look beyond the observable integration 
of various functions into the unity of an organism to some 
psychical or voluntary ground of organic teleology. Though 
he took for granted that all processes within the organic 
whole invite physico-chemical explanation, the organismic 
biologist, according to Cassirer, considered that organic 
wholeness and historicity of vital process could not be com- 
pletely grasped as mere sums of causal chains. They could, 
however, be explored by Werent, more specialized metl~ods.~ 
A dogmatic antithesis of ultimate causes, mechanical us. vital, 
was converted into a difference between two methods, a 
division of labor for research. In a sense, perhaps more pro- 
found than Wiener's, it was understood that the question of 
vitalism us. mechanism had at first been ineptly put. 
Thus far had informed thinking reached without the aid 
of cybernetics. But Cassirer's chapter on vitalism refers to no 
work published later than 1934, and if we read it with the 
wisdom of cybernetic hindsight, we perceive that it leaves the 
physics of "information" and communication engineering out 
of account. But if these have an outstanding contribution to 
make to biology, it will consist precisely in illuminating the 
theoretical conditions of any organization of a plurality of 
actual elements into integrally functioning wholes. If cyber- 
netic theory is ~ight ,  organization and wholeness require 
communication and mutual adjustment of parts within the 
whole as well as adaptation of the whole to circumstances 
by response to signals received from without. Cybernetics 
supplies a mathematically implemented theory of the reguIa- 
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tory physical mechanisms which make such wholeness ma- 
terially possible. That is a new achievement, and its value is 
difficult to exaggerate. 
Thus we may sympathize with Wiener in holding that 
cybernetics has assured to vitalism a victory which is, never- 
theless, complete defeat, since "the new mechanics is as 
mechanistic as the old." The self-regulating device or "servo- 
mechanism" is as truly an automaton as any clockwork. If the 
functional wholeness of organisms, which is presumably pe- 
culiar to life, can be reduced to automatism, the ultimate 
winner seems to be philosopl~ical mechanism. If this is so, 
then to say of the cybernetic contribution that it  showed the 
question to have been badly put hardly goes far enough. If 
Wiener's confidence in cybernetic automata is justified, then 
the only real question ever at issue has been settled. It is 
hard to see how the question raised by vitalists could have 
been more clearly put in terms of ideas and information avail- 
able at the time the controversy arose. The controversy, more- 
over, may be said to have greatly clarified the question, if we 
accept Cassirer's account, since it brought to the fore the 
very problem of organization about which cybernetics has 
something new to say. The question had not been badly put 
but badly answered, whether in terms of entelechies on one 
side or in terms of power engineering on the other. The vital 
issue emerged as a problem of communication and control, 
which can now be subjected to a varied and resourceful ex- 
perimental attack with the aid of logically exact, formal 
theory. 
On the other hand, it  should not be overlooked that, just 
as a new concept of mechanism had to be developed in order 
to account for the behavior of certain complex wholes, the 
cybernetic mechanism may not itself account for all modes 
of higher organic behavior. I t  is not clear how far Wiener 
himself cares to go. He seems chary of the label "material- 
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ism,"g although no one can doubt that the line from Descartes' 
animal automaton runs through La Mettrie's machine man 
and Jacques Loeb's animal tropisms10 direct to Wiener's 
subsumption of mechanical, animal, and human behavior 
under the same theory. If this is the last word, then we must 
revise Pope, for henceforth, the best study of mankind wiU 
be Eniac. Even so, Wiener does not hesitate to speak of 
"ruthless operators," of '%naves" and "fools," of 'lies," "ex- 
ploiters of g~llibility,"'~ "slave labor," 'Xucksters" (with dis- 
paragement), and he proposes the idea1 of "a society based 
on human values other than buying and selling,'"Vhat 
meaning these expressions can have in a world of automata is 
impossible to say. For that matter, what meaning can any- 
thing have for an automaton? 
With this question we pass from life to mind. The dialecti- 
cal situation remains much the same. The idealistic insistence 
on the uniqueness of mind or spirit has always found its 
chief support in the activities of scientific understanding, 
artistic creation, moral achievement, and religious devotion, 
to which the reductionist expedients of materialists have 
never in the past proved adequate. The strongest trend of 
philosophical thinking in this century, nevertheless, has re- 
jected the "dogmatic antithesis" of mind and matter, and has 
tried in various ways to reconcile them in the all-embracing 
unity of "Nature." Most philosophers of our generation take 
for granted that psychical processes are inseparably associ- 
ated with physical processes and require them in order to 
exist, but a decided lack of clarity prevails about the kind 
of physical processes required. Here, again, cybernetics comes 
up with novel and experimentally useful suggestions, Here, 
again, the older forms of materialism turn out to be mistaken, 
but mistaken in a way that yields the anti-materialist small 
comfort. 
With characteristic alertness to new scientific deveIop- 
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ments, F. S. C. Northrop has commented on some cybernetic 
suggestions respecting the higher activities of man.'Tyber- 
netics, he says, has made a place in natural science for the 
interpretation of thinking, universals, purposes, and the con- 
trol of individual human behavior by cultural norms, and 
has, moreover, provided a film scientific support for the com- 
monsense belief in the efficacy of human purposes in de- 
termining concrete events in nature. He considers this 
achievement a concTusive scientific refutation of every ma- 
terialism, Marxist or otherwise, that assigns to ideas and 
social theories a dependent, epiphenomenal, or parasitic 
status in the physical world. Ideas, he says, have been shown 
to exist as physical processes no less fully verifiable than 
other physical processes and no less capable of producing 
physical consequences in outward behavior. But, he adds, 
this refutation of materialism cannot be turned to the ad- 
vantage of other traditional philosophies, because it refutes 
them also, every one of them, whether dualistic, mentalistic, 
or positivisti~.'~ For cybernetics casts doubt on an assump- 
tion on which Northrop considers traditional philosophies to 
have agreed, the assumption, namely, that natural science 
cannot find room for pul-poses, universals, and social norms 
and ideals among its objects. Cybernetics apparently saves 
these phenomena without an ultimate distinction between 
mental and physical processes, because it has available a 
previously unrecognized distinction between two types of 
physical automata. As in the case of vitalism, anti-materialism 
wins, but wins a Pyrrhic victory. The older materialism had 
long since been discredited by the breakdown of classical 
concepts of matter and mechanics, but the statistical con- 
ceptions of cybernetics leave no more room for mind than did 
the old-fashioned theories. 
On the other hand, the resultant view restores, as was 
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noted, several notions to scientific respectability which look 
distinctly odd in a mechanistic context. Perhaps the most 
striking of them is the notioiz of form, which is restored to 
almost Aristotelian prominence as a factor to be reckoned 
with. Northrop was, I believe, among the first to point out 
that mechanisms which adjust their behavior in predeter- 
mined ways to the pattern of the input react to the universal 
in the particular event rather than to the particularity of the 
energy in the event.15 Recalling Aristotle's word about per- 
ception,'be may describe such a machine as receiving the 
form without the matter. One consequence of this is memory, 
which works by freeing the universal from dependence upon 
a particular occasion; and, according to the cybernetic 
analogy, any device such as a punched tape, photographic 
film, or phonograph record, performs the storage function 
essential to memory. The notion that memory involves some 
sort of enduring "impression" made on the mind by sense 
perception is certainly as old as Plato's simile of the wax 
tablet,17 and the notion that it depends on some sort of phys- 
iological trace cannot be younger than Hobbes' "decaying 
sen~e,"'~ But the beginnings of an empirical treatment 
of the physiological traces belong to the recent past. The 
details, about which much remains to be learned, need not 
detain us.'' I t  is in general sufficient to recognize that progress 
in understanding has come about by interpreting the problem 
of memory as one of storing infoimation (form or pattern) 
and making it available for use, perhaps by embracing it at  
some point within a regenerative loop." Thus the adroitness 
of an experienced man reflects his "much memory"21 in the 
form of circuits established in his nervous system by past ex- 
perience. Empirical universals, ideas, concepts, or defining 
forms have apparently become hard physiological verifacts as 
well as familiar objects of psychological commonsense. As 
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Northrop has emphasized, the old difficulty of explaining how 
ideas can modify physical behavior has disappeared, since 
ideas have a physical embodiment capable of influencing de- 
cisively the behavior of an organism. Not much energy is 
involved, but there is quite enough, since the most important 
aspect of the nerve cell is not its own power but its connec- 
tions. 
If perception consists in response to, and memory in con- 
servation of, pattern or form, it follows that universals have 
a status and efficacy quite at variance with the customary 
nominalism of empiricism, materialism and naturalism. Cy- 
bernetics goes far towards restoring the formal cause to 
scientific respectability. '"Information," says Wiener, "is in- 
formation, not matter or energy."22 Now it is a cardinal 
principle of cybernetic doctrine that some mechanisms re- 
spond to "information" rather than to the material or ener- 
getic vehicle which carries it. The efficient determining 
cause is the information or type of order, and this is not the 
same as the material cause of the modern era. Of course, 
ccinformation" cannot exist without some physical embodi- 
ment, or form without matter. But one cannot be reduced to 
the other. A complete account of the behavior of automatic 
controls, therefore, must cover both. 
The great computing machines having been designed to 
carry out logical and mathematical operations of the kind 
men perform, it is not surprising to find that the brain is 
assumed to function like the digital c~mpute r s .~Var ren  S. 
McCulloch and Walter Pitts showed that neural networks of 
regenerative loops possess, as Northrop puts it, all the formal 
properties of the logic of Principia Mathematics. In  a word, 
a logical calculus lies innate in the structure of the human 
nervous system, so that it can perform all deductive opera- 
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tions symbolized in modern logic (including, of course, Aris- 
totelian logic as a restricted case).'~McCullocl~ and Pitts 
have, moreover, shown that the human brain has the prop- 
erties required, in principle, to compute any logical conse- 
quence of its input.*' 
So much for the theory. In practice, the computing 
machine and the brain will exhibit limitations inherent in 
their structure. Wiener has briefly alluded to the possibiIity 
that the n~echanics of the brain may limit the powers of 
thought. "The machina ratiomtrix is nothing but the calculus 
rationator of Leibniz with an engine in it; and just as modern 
mathematical logic begins with this calculus, so it is inevita- 
ble that its present engineering development should cast new 
light on logic. . . the study of logic must reduce to the study 
of the logical machine, whether nervous or mechanical, with 
all its nonremovable limitations and  imperfection^."^' This . 
is not, as Wiener points out, the same thing as "'psychologiz- 
ing'' logic, but only asserts that logic can meaningfully "con- 
tain nothing which the human mind-and hence the human 
nervous system-is unable to encompass." 
Now, this cybernetic doctrine of the function of the brain 
in thinking supplies unwitting support to a kind of functional 
a priorism. If thinking is nothing but the functioning of the 
computing machine of the brain, it is limited to forms of 
operation permitted by the electrical network of the nervous 
system. The possible functions of thought are "built in," and 
though capable of specific modification by "input" (sense- 
data, for example), they remain generically fixed. The laws 
of logic are grounded not only in ontology but, precisely, in 
the electrical engineering of the brain. The universals pre- 
viously mentioned, that enter into reverberating circuits for 
use are empirical universals; but the forms of the logical 
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operations of the brain express its structure, independently of 
sense experience and learning. The forms are in that respect 
a rational a priori akin to Kant2s, 
In  a sense, this a prwri may even be described as syn- 
thetic, although the adjective would hardly come to mind 
save for historic reasons. Logically, the results of a computing 
machine are analytic consequences of the premises fed into 
it. But the construction of the machine itself combines its 
diverse operations into a functional unity. Similarly the unity 
of the mind is functionally synthetic and may be presumed 
to require stiuctural unity-in-diversity of the nervous system, 
considered as an electrical network with certain describable 
properties. Kant intended in the transcendental deduction of 
the categories to identify the basic operations of the under- 
standing by contrasting its "output7' with its "inputy7-objec- 
tive knowledge (science) with bare sense perception. Neuro- 
physiology may now also study the electrical mechanisms 
which produce some of the observed results. Once more we 
find cybernetics codrming older, non-materialist specula- 
tions but at the same time taking new ground for mecha- 
nism. 
Comparison of this physiology of reason with Kant's 
transcendental analytic is a delicate matter. We should guard 
against exaggeration. My point is simply that in following out 
the mechanist ambition to physiologize the mind, the cyber- 
neticist inadvertently supports the ancient rationalistic con- 
viction that the forms of reason are native to the mind 
independently of experience. Yet, though Kant would pre- 
sumably agree that scientific psychology as well as brain 
physiology must be rigorously deterministic (not to say 
mechanistic) in order to be objectively valid, he would not 
precipitately identify scientific thinking with the objects 
thought about. 
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Nowhere, however, is the cybesnetic contribution more 
striking than in the treatment of purpose, which is behavior- 
istically defined and then explained on the model of the 
servomechanism. About a decade ago, Arh~ro Rosenblueth, 
Norbert Wiener, and Julian Bigelow discussed the topic in a 
paper rich in ideas,27 They offer definitions of "puiposeful" 
and "teleological" behavior in strictly descriptive terms that 
apply equally to machines, organisms, and men. Anything 
exhibits purposeful behavior if it may '%e interpreted as 
directed to the attainment of a goal," the goal being thought 
of as "a definite correlation in time or space with respect to 
I< 
another object or e~ent." '~ Nonpurposeful behavior is ran- 
dom." Because it has a direction, purposeful behavior indi- 
cates the presence in the behaving entity of a control 
responsive to the goal, just such control as the automatic 
governor achieves through the negative feedback. The 
authors suggest that purposeful behavior always depends at  
some point on a servon~echanism. 
Purposeful behavior is termed "teleological" when it  is 
"contro11ed by error of reaction" (via negative feedback) "in 
the course of the behavior."'~or example, an acoustical tor- 
pedo behaves teleologically, because it continually adjusts its 
course to signals reaching it from the target. 
Rosenblueth, Wiener, and Bigelow draw two philosophi- 
cally significant conclusions from reflection on the mecha- 
nisms which implement purpose: (I)  The opposite of 
teleology is not determinism but non-teleological determi- 
nism; and (2)  animals and machines diger not in behavior 
but "functionally," that is, in the materials and structures 
which function to produce the observable behavior. Specifi- 
cally, machines are mostly metallic, with simple molecules; 
they exhibit large differences of potential, rely on electronic 
conduction, peimit rapid mobilization of energy, Organisms, 
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on the other hand, are colloidal, with large molecules; they 
depend on ionic conduction, have a more uniform distribu- 
tion and less rapid mobilization of energy. Organism and 
machine differ also in the method of achieving scope and 
flexibility. The former does so by multiplication of simul- 
taneous effects, as in the eye with its large number of cones 
and rods; the latter multiplies successive effects, the tele- 
vision receiver, for example, forming an image in a single 
"cone" by scanning many millions of signals per second.30 
Though these so-called functional, or internal, differences 
between animals and machines are specific, they are not 
generic, all alike being physical and even mechanical in the 
larger sense, and they do not differentiate the behavior of one 
from that of the other. Even machines behave "teleologi- 
cally," according to the cybernetic view, in precisely the same 
sense as animals and men. 
Thus we return to the first of the two conclusions men- 
tioned above, which is that teleology not only is consistent 
with mechanism, but even requires it, since "purposeful" and 
"teleological" apply descriptively to behavior only, whereas 
mechanism refers to its functional basis. Behavior and 
function go together-purposeful behavior and controlled 
function. Teleology us. mechanism presents a false antithesis, 
the one being descriptive of behavior and the other explana- 
tory of it. "Purposefulness, as defined here, is quite independ- 
ent of causality, initial or final,"s1 "Causality," we are told, 
means a one-way, irreversible functional relationship. In the 
explanation of behavior we rely on mechanisms, for statistical 
mechanics is still deterministic, and chance is not moral free- 
dom. "Tyche," Wiener observes, "is as relentless a mistress 
as A~~anke. ' '~~ 
Rosenblueth, Wiener, and Bigelow go yet farther. They 
suggest that teleological behavior which is "predictive" (as 
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when a gunner shoots ahead of a flying duck) may fittingly 
be classified as "intelligent." The more complex the predic- 
tion is, the more intelligent is the beha~ior.'~ Functionally, 
intelligent behavior requires a computing macliine capable of 
performing on the past of a curve the operations necessary 
to obtain valid predictive extrapolations. The torpedo that 
pursues a loud noise, the flower that faces the moving sun, 
the moth that dies in the flame, the human eye that is cap- 
tured by the flickering glare of electric signs, these all exhibit 
simple tropisms. On the other hand, a radar-directed anti- 
aircraft gun and a duck hunter act intelligently. Both form 
simultaneous estimates of the target's and the missile's prob- 
able course. On a given occasion, the gun may well behave 
more "intelligently" than the hunter. 
As a final, somewhat ironic comment on the cybe~netic 
notion of purposeful mechanisms, observe that the mechanist 
cannot now reject a priori the possibility of cosmic teleology 
-that "through the ages one increasing purpose runs." "Pur- 
pose" will obviously not have theistic overtones as it did for 
Tennyson. But there is no a prwri reason why cosmic systems 
may not include negative feedbacks and hence behave "pur- 
po~efully~~ in the cybernetic sense, or why the universe could 
not form a teleological whole, although a posteriori evidence 
for holding that it does may be inconclusive, if not lacking. 
Biologists, historians, and phiIosophers have often thought 
they could detect a direction in events-an "upward" trend 
in evolution, a (Hegelian or Marxist) diaIectic of history, a 
'hisus toward totality," an emergent deity. But in this case 
as in all others, the goal toward which cosmic process may be 
interpreted as tending would be the outcome of an automatic 
process entirely devoid of value connotation. 
While it is important to appreciate the value of the cyber- 
netic contribution to several philosophical theories, which 
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were rapidly reviewed, it is not less important to avoid ex- 
pecting more than can be delivered. Cybernetic ideas have 
not introduced a genuinely new altelmative into philosophy. 
Crude dualisms of mind-body, organism-machine, teleology- 
mechanism have long been rejected in favor of some sort of 
reconciliation-though on that point opinions have differed. 
Cybernetics has had something to say that is worth listening 
to with close attention, but it has as yet approached its task 
with mechanistic presuppo~itions,~' which conceal from view 
the range of human experience that always has made the 
notions of mind and of purpose both important to philoso- 
phers and puzzling. That kind of omission normally accom- 
panies scientific specialization and is amply justified by 
results. But methodological convenience may become dog- 
matic bias if taken up uncritically into the philosophic quest 
for comprehensive adequacy. 
To be philosophically adequate, a theory must be able to 
account for its own existence, but that is what cybernetics 
cannot do if it is converted forthwith into a comprehensive 
theory. Cybernetics accounts for many things but not for 
itself, for the science, the knowledge, of cybernetics. The 
cyberneticist has much to say about the brain and other 
mechanisms, but not about understanding the brain. He 
easily reconciles teleology and mechanism, as long as he does 
not mention the only significant purpose which enters into 
the picture. He can explain "memory" but not 'iemembrance 
of things past." 
Consider, for example, the treatment of teleology and 
mechanism. An apparent reconciliation of these is brought 
about by defining them in terms of a methodological distinc- 
tion between behavioristic and functional study. The former 
concerns "any change of an entity with respect to its sur- 
roundings"; the latter investigates ''tile specific structure and 
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intrinsic organization of the ~bject.'~" The former is descrip- 
tive and non-causal; the latter is explanatory and causal. 
They are, therefore, complementary to one another rather 
than antithetical. 
This would be very convincing if the argument did not 
begin with a stipulated definition of "teleological behavior" 
which includes as its differentia the functional notion of 
negative feedback in the course of behavior. By definition, no 
opposition between teleology and mechanism goes deeper 
than a shift of the investigator's center of interest, for it is 
clear that whether an account is behavioristic or functional 
depends on what the investigator has selected as delimiting 
the object of study and not on any ultimate difference of 
method. The functional analysis of an entity describes the 
behavior of some of its constituents; the description of the 
behavior of an entity exhibits it as a functional part of some 
more inclusive system. The two accounts supplement one 
another without any alteration whatever in fundamental 
point of view, which seeks and finds only physical automa- 
tism~, causal and statistical. This, of course, does not in any 
sense constitute an objection to cybernetic analyses and 
stipulated definitions. But philosophically, the only lesson to 
be drawn from them is that if you begin with mechanism and 
admit nothing else along the way, you will end with mecha- 
nism, And that is a truism. A choice of definitions alone will 
not prove that the purposiveness which men sometimes 
exhibit is nothing but the automaton's "purposeful behavior." 
If the "nothing but" is assumed right down the line, then 
bare mechanism is a foregone conclusion, and Northrop's 
celebration of the demise of epiphenominalism would appear 
to be somewhat premature. On the other hand, Wiener him- 
self unquestionably talks quite often as if mechanism is far 
from the last word. "'He who studies the nervous system can- 
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not forget the mind," he writes, "and he who studies the 
mind cannot forget the nervous system."36 But if mind is 
nothing but nervous system in action, there would be nothing 
to forget while studying the nervous system, Actually, cyber- 
netic research relies constantly on what the cyberneticist 
knows about the mind before he begins to study the brain. 
He knows what it means to be an intelligent, conscious 
being, engaged in various modes of purposive activity, in- 
cluding empirical and mathematical enquiry. The record of 
his steady reliance on this dirnknsion of experience is so writ- 
ten across the vocabulary of cybernetics that he who runs 
may read. In the history of modern science there is scarcely 
a parallel to its brazenly anthropomorphic terminology- 
"information," "memory," 'cprediction," "purpose," "intelli- 
gent behavior," and even "wilY3' and "con~cience,"~~ "valua- 
t i o n ' b d  In an unguarded moment, while com- 
menting on computing machines that can also detect and 
erase errors in their "memory," McCulloch wrote: "Conse- 
quently, they may p~.efe.~. magnetic tapes to punch cards,"*' 
as if the machines cared or could tell the difference. A slip of 
the pen, no doubt; but how eloquent! 
A theory developed in connection with the designing of 
machines to perform some of the functions of the human 
mind should not forget other functions which it has not 
copied. The human brain may indeed work Iike a computing 
machine; the machine, after all, was made in its image. But 
the brain does something which artificial machines appar- 
ently come no closer to doing than ever, namely, support a 
conscious system which takes notice of the results of operat- 
ing upon the "input," knows something about how the results 
were obtained, and recognizes objects which transcend the 
results.4i This involves explicit recognition of the past as past 
(not simply as stored "form") and anticipation of the future 
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as futzj~e. A machine may "learn," "forget," "recall," "pre- 
dict," "evaluate," "choose," and in many ways embody an 
undirectional time; it never is awara of its input as sense 
data, never questions, infers, understands, never prefers, 
aspires, or grows in range of insight. It can "select an opti- 
mum alternative," but it cannot care about it, much less 
criticize its standard of selection or conceive of any other, 
not to say a higher one. 
There can be little doubt that many mental operations are 
unconscious, suggesting dependence upon an automatic 
apparatus, in satisfactory agreement with cybernetic analo- 
gies, Even the creative work of genius corresponds to this 
pattern, as does the familiar prudential practice of "sleeping 
on" a difficult decision. But no unconscious machine can 
recognize the value of a novel combination of elements that 
suddenly comes alive with unsuspected significance. As for 
that matter, the work of the automaton remains aimless and 
meaningless unless at some point it receives conscious recog- 
nition, direction, appreciation. Every calculating machine re- 
quires a human operator to transform the output (even 
though it be "information" rather than matter or energy)*' 
into cognition. An indispensable feature of every computing 
machine is a mathematician (if only a bookkeeper) at the 
input and a mathematician at the output to understand the 
results as answering his question. Cybernetics tends to treat 
the human worker as a needlessly complex device for regu- 
lating a machine in a fashion that better designed servo- 
mechanisms could do more efficiently. But we must under- 
stand that from the point of view of a mind, the machine is 
an extension of its bodily instruments of purpose and action. 
Far from enabling us to dispense with mind as a problem, 
the complex cybernetic mechanisms require the whole his- 
tory of western science to account for them. 
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To forget the man who makes and uses machines for his 
own ends is to forget the one distinctively purposive being 
available for study. The only purpose which the acoustic 
torpedo exhibits as it runs its "single-minded" course is the 
destructive intention which made and fired it, It is all one 
to the torpedo whether it reaches its "goal," wildly oscillates 
between extreme deviations from its proper course, or turns 
back and demolishes the vessel that fired it. It has no pur- 
pose; its goal is not its goal. I t  is an automaton designed for 
human purposes. There are in nature similar automatisms 
that no man made, But if nature is all mechanical, why 
should there not be mechanisms of many kinds, including 
self-regulating systems? What forces us to inject the notion 
of purpose into the situation? The heliotrope turns toward 
the sun, because perhaps that mechanism favored survival. 
But where is a purpose there, unless we attribute to the plant 
an endeavor to survive? But "endeavor" is not a concept of 
mechanics. 
Perhaps it  may be suggested that the mechanism is the 
purpose: "Now, the purpose of voluntary acts is not a matter 
of arbitrary interpretation but a physiological fact. When we 
perform a voluntary action, what we select voluntarily is a 
specific purpose, not a specific movement."" So be it. What 
then is the voluntary act of selecting a purpose? And is a 
purpose as a physiological fact a purpose before it is selected, 
or is it only a potential purpose? Is the selective act a higher 
purpose automatically "selecting a lower, or is it in some 
sense the man's whoIe character expressing and shaping 
itself? Is it the integral man seeking to give meaning to his 
individuality under the specific circumstances provided by a 
particular occasion? 
To questions of this kind, cybernetic authors do not at- 
tempt answers. Cybernetics piles up the evidence against a 
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crude materialism, which has long been discredited. But it 
leaves the status of mind or mentality in obscurity. Either 
consciousness, attention, the awareness of being a purposive 
activity, the knowledge of objective facts, insight into a 
human world about us, and appreciation of significant form 
make a difference or they do not. If they do, then cybernetic 
description of outward behavior and physiological function 
sketches an incomplete picture of human nature. Anybody 
who may be tempted to  doubt this conclusion would do well 
first to account for cybernetic science itself without any 
appeal to minds or mentality capable of insight, foresight, 
understanding, intention, doubt, and rational satisfaction,- 
in a word, let him begin with an explanation of how there 
can be science without cognition. 
Nobody would deny that the individual requires mecha- 
nisms when he thinks as well as when he acts. Yet the mind 
recognizes problems, is anguished by ignorance, and has a 
concern for the continuance of its own individuality and for 
the prosperity of its kind, and these facts have no analogues 
in the behavior of any known mechanism for automatic con- 
trol. The computing machine has no problems of its own. 
The thermostat, the gun pointer, the automatic pilot-these 
react to the "information" at hand and never doubt its suf- 
ficiency. The torpedo will guide itself by "error of reaction" 
but never by the wisdom of its plans. A moth's self-immola- 
tion makes an uncanny impression on us, because its feeble 
individuality is so dominated by its phototropic automatism 
in the presence of a flame. 
An individual able to h o w  its world and itself to some 
degree can see itself within a cybernetic context and hence 
can choose to act, not merely through a so-called "purpose" 
tripped by impulses flowing in upon it from without, but in 
the light of its understanding. Such an individual, moreover, 
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discovers he can bind himself by the conception of a justice 
that embraces all men, and thus can subordinate his life to 
a free possibility nowhere empirically vedable as an actu- 
ality in human relations. An individual of that kind is 
teleologically free in a quite distinctive sense on which servo- 
mechanisms alone throw no light whatsoever. He intervenes 
decisively in the unfolding adventures of mechanical systems; 
through him or in him does conscious and enlightened pur- 
pose emerge in the aimless monotony of the physical world. 
At some stage, physical systems seem to embark upon a 
new career, and the value of utility becomes a determining 
factor in events. Not merely the quantity and not merely the 
pattern of energy, but the value of it in what for a century 
has been romantically called the "struggle for survival" has 
to be taken into account. In addition to the numerical values 
of physical description, the biological value of survival is 
required for the scientific understanding of life. At that level, 
the individual begins to count and to impress its own de- 
mands upon the streaming transformations of energy. Reac- 
tion, no doubt with the aid of negative feedback, has become 
adaptive response. But again, achieved organization reaches 
into a new dimension with the mentaIity that looks all round, 
and seeing itself within a world, not only responds but takes 
the initiative and acts. Through this action there occasionally 
comes into existence a goodness, both original and fructify- 
ing, that forms the core of man's concern. 
The range of experience to which these remarks allude is 
one that the new automatism, like the old, leaves in dark- 
ness. That is not surprising. Though indeed a significant 
advance in our knowledge of physical systems, cybernetics 
offers no new alternative to philosophy. But we may be 
aratehl to it for stimuIating fresh thought about long-vexed b 
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questions and for bringing us perhaps closer to a new and 
more satisfying hypothesis about the relation of life and mind 
and mechanism. We need a basis for closer agreement be- 
tween those who are concerned with behavior and those who 
are concelned with responsible action. 
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